Although the WIC food assistance program purchases over one-half of all US infant formula, I find the program has little impact on the prices paid by non-WIC customers. I estimate infant-formula marginal cost and find that it is low compared to price, implying large price-cost markups. But, the WIC program is not to blame. Instead large price-cost markups are likely due to customer's price insensitivity. WIC's impact on non-WIC customers comes through an increase in sales owing to a WIC -spill-over‖ effect. The WIC approved brand attains a prominence in the market that makes it a natural choice for non-WIC customers, which makes attaining WIC approval valuable to firms. Firms bid with rebates to attain exclusive WIC approved status which results in significant reductions in the cost of infant formula to the US government.
Introduction
Total infant formula sales in the US were $3.4 billion in 2005 and over one-half of this total was purchased through the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) (Oliveira, Frazao, and Smallwood 2010) . Government agencies are frequent purchasers of products in otherwise unregulated markets. 1 The economic consequences of such interventions are not well known. First-order effects are often obvious as the government uses its size to negotiate terms more favorable than other purchasers. However, government procurement can have other distortionary effects. For example, Fiona and Duggan (2006) find that Medicaid purchases of prescription drugs are associated with higher drug prices in general. WIC is the third-largest U.S. Federal food-assistance program and is administered by the U.S.D.A. Food
Nutrition Service in conjunction with state and local health departments. It annually supplies grants to States to provide supplemental foods, and a variety of services to low-income women;
infants; and children up to age five. Infant formula is an item supplied to participating infants less than one year old, and infant formula costs represent a large portion of overall food costs.
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Because the cost of providing infant formula to WIC infants was increasing during the 70s and 80s, States became concerned the high cost of that item was severely limiting the number of eligible persons that could be served. 3 To limit costs, States devised an auction format whereby infant-formula manufacturers could bid on the right to be a state's sole supplier of WIC infant formula. In exchange for this right, manufacturers paid a rebate on each can of infant formula 1 The ingredients and production of infant formula are highly regulated, but infant formula prices to non-WIC customers are unregulated. 2 The GAO reports that infant formula costs represented 16 percent of the $5.2 billion allocated to WIC in 2005 (GAO 2006 . 3 The GAO measured wholesale price increases, adjusted for the general rate of inflation, at about 3 percent, (1983-84), 6 percent (1985-86) , and 2.5 percent (1987) (1988) (GAO, 1998) .
sold through the WIC program. Manufacturers provided sealed bids for the size of the rebate they would pay and the manufacturer supplying the largest rebate was awarded the exclusive right to supply formula.
Rebates are very effective at reducing costs; winning rebates have averaged about 85 to 90 percent of manufacturers' wholesale prices and have routinely returned over $1.5 billion to the WIC program annually. This may be the government exercising monopsony power to acquire infant formula at lower prices than the general public. However, the magnitude of rebates relative to manufacturers' wholesale prices leads to questions about the relationship between wholesale price and marginal cost. It seems either manufactures' sell formula at a substantial level below marginal cost to WIC customers, or that wholesale prices far exceed marginal cost.
Wholesale price above marginal cost is perhaps expected given the highly concentrated structure of the formula market. Currently, three manufacturers (Mead Johnson, Ross, and Carnation) produce about 99 percent of domestic sales (Oliveira and Davis 2006) . Wyeth, a fourth manufacturer, was active in the domestic infant formula market until 1996. And, brands likely possess pricing power because purchasers are likely very price insensitive as mothers are hesitant to make changes once an infant has grown accustomed to a brand (Samuels 1993) .
Industry watchers have also noted the increase in the number of participating WIC infants and the dramatic rise in infant formula prices and speculated a causal relationship.
Perhaps WIC removes the more-price sensitive customers from the market leaving firms with the ability to raise price to the remaining relatively price insensitive non-WIC customers (Prell 2004; Oliveira et. al. 2004; Betson 2009 ) Others have speculated that large rebates are subsidized by higher prices in the non-WIC market (GAO 1998) The interplay of the WIC program, WIC's rebate system, and sales to non-WIC customers has been the source of congressional investigations and several government agency investigations. The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights held hearings on the pricing behavior of infant formula companies in 1990 (Oliveira et. al. 2004 ). The
Federal Trade Commission investigated anticompetitive pricing practices of infant formula manufactures in early 1990s (Oliveira et. al. 2004 ). The General Accounting (Accountability)
Office (GAO) has produced three investigative reports on these issues (GAO 1990 , GAO 1998 , and GAO 2006 . Similarly, the Economics Research Service of USDA has produced several research reports examining WIC, WIC rebates, and infant formula prices (Oiveira, et. al. 2004; Prell 2004; Oliveira and Davis 2006; Oliveira, Frazao, Smallwood 2010) . This article is the first to develop a comprehensive model of WIC's affect on infant formula pricing. It examines prices to non-WIC customers and WIC's affect on them, and it empirically identifies the benefit to firms of being the sole provider of infant formula to a WIC agency. I find marginal cost to be low relative to wholesale price, and so price-cost markups to non-WIC customers are large.
While rebates are large, the net price paid (wholesale price minus rebate) by WIC is often above marginal cost and manufactures earn profits from WIC customers. However, net prices are sometimes below marginal cost. I show that the WIC program in its current form, with rebates, will not affect non-WIC price-cost markups if rebates change 1-to-1 with wholesale prices; I provide empirical evidence that this has been the case (until recently). Instead, the firm that holds the exclusive right to sell to WIC customers provides a sizable increase in sales to non-WIC customers, which provides an incentive for firms (occasionally) to offer net prices below marginal cost. I estimate a parameter that indicates that the two major WIC suppliers expect their share of non-WIC sales to increase about 30-40 percent once they become the exclusive WIC supplier in an area.
Background and Literature
The Infant formula is a food item available to participating infants less than one year old.
Because of the large number of infants in the US who participate in WIC, WIC purchases of infant formula account for over 50 percent of the product's sales (GAO 1998; Oliveira, Frazao, and Smallwood 2010) . 5 During the 1970s and 1980s infant formula prices increased more than the rate of inflation and the rising cost of infant formula limited the ability of state agencies to serve all eligible individuals leading them to investigate ways to limit infant-formula costs.
While most agencies distribute formula through retailers, a few agencies use other methods of distribution. Vermont currently uses a home-delivery system and Mississippi uses a directdistribution system, and some counties in Ohio and Maryland have used direct-distribution methods in past years (Harvey et. al. 1988) . These States were successful in providing infant formula at reduced costs by using a variety of methods that gave preference to one brand of infant formula. In particular Mississippi used a system of warehouses across the state to distribute infant formula and purchased infant formula in bulk. Starting in 1984 Mississippi used a competitive bidding process to select the manufacturer that would sell formula to the state at the lowest cost (Harvey et. al 1988) . Using the experiences of these States as examples, in 1986 WIC officials in Tennessee developed a system whereby a single manufacturer was awarded the exclusive right to provide infant formula in that state in exchange for a rebate on each unit sold through the program in that state. Distribution remained through approved retail vendors.
Manufacturers offered their rebates for consideration via sealed bids and the contract was awarded to the manufacturer who offered the highest rebate per unit sold (subsequently, agencies have moved to a process whereby the firm offering the lowest net price, wholesale price minus rebate, received the exclusive right to sell to WIC customers). by the opportunity for hard data suggesting which method provided the greatest cost savings.
This usually led to the adoption of a sole-source competitive bidding system.
In October 1988, federal law required all WIC agencies to explore implementing costcontainment methods for procuring infant formula and to begin implementing cost-containment practices if they proved to lower costs. In 1989, federal law required all state agencies to adopt a competitive bidding process or another process that provided equal or greater savings. The law defined -competitive bidding as a procurement process in which the State WIC agency selects the single source offering the lowest price for the infant formula, as determined by the submission of sealed bids (Oliveira et. al. 2004) .‖ State agencies' rebate systems have been very successful reducing the cost of procuring infant formula. Figure 1 shows winning rebates, wholesale prices, and net prices (wholesale price minus rebate) for winning contracts from mid 1998 to 2006 (13-ounce can of milk-based liquid concentrate). Clearly, net prices are low compared to wholesale prices.
Development of the WIC rebate system has been a boon to WIC agencies as procurement costs have been reduced allowing more eligible WIC participants to be served. In a 1990 report,
The General Accounting Office (GAO, now the General Accountability Office) examined the implementation and success of various infant formula cost containment practices (GAO 1990) .
They concluded that most agencies had implemented cost-containment measures and that solesource, sealed bid contracts lead to the greatest cost savings.
More recently the size of the rebates has led to speculation, and some research, about the source for large rebates. Selling below cost may be profit maximizing if manufactures are able to subsidize the loss with increased profits from non-WIC customers. For example, if WIC produces a -spillover effect‖ whereby the WIC contract brand is given preference by non-WIC customers, then there may be an incentive for manufacturers to secure the WIC contract even if that means selling to WIC customers at a loss. In a 1998 report, GAO identified two potential sources for a spillover effect. Doctors may give preference to the WIC brand of infant formula when recommending a brand to mothers. Or, WIC contracts may give the WIC brand greater shelf-space on store shelves increasing sales to non-WIC customers (GAO 1998) . Because sales to WIC customers represent over one-half of all sales, it seems likely the WIC brand would receive a more prominent location, and a larger share of shelf-space. While the GAO's 1998 report recognized the possibility of a spillover effect, it discounted the possibility of it being large enough to entice manufactures to sell to WIC below cost. In a 2006 report, GAO again visited the topic of infant formula rebates. That study reiterated the possibility that a -spillover effect‖ may be an important determinant of manufacturer rebate bids. The report stated that all three major infant formula manufactures noted the importance of product placement and shelf space in their marketing strategies, and that 31 of 51 WIC directors responding to a survey stated they believed shelf-space was an important determinant of rebate bids. Oliveira, et. al. (2004) noted that since the implementation of rebate programs, the retail price of infant formula has risen faster than inflation. 7 They suggest that WIC and its rebate program may affect retail prices to non-WIC customers in two ways. WIC may remove many of the price sensitive, low-income customers from the market, leaving only less price sensitive high-income customers paying for infant formula out of their own pockets. With few pricesensitive customers actually paying for infant formula, manufactures may be able to charge higher prices. Alternatively, they suggest a spillover effect from sole-source contracts may increase demand for the contract brand from non-WIC customers, leading to higher retail prices.
An event study analysis and a multiple regression analysis suggested that being the contract brand of infant formula increased that brand's price and that the larger the size of the WIC market relative to the non-WIC market the higher the price of the contract and non-contract brands of infant formula.
Betson ( perfectly inelastic demand and non-WIC mothers somewhat elastic demand. A rebate program 7 The 1998 GAO report also notes that infant formula prices increased at a real rate of about 9 percent annually after sole-source contracts were mandated, compared to about 3 percent in other time periods.
allows firms to identify the WIC customers with perfectly inelastic demand and effectively charge them a different price, price minus the rebate. Because WIC customers are no longer considered in pricing to non-WIC customers, the firm's pricing decision is now based only on the remaining non-WIC customers' relatively more-elastic demand. The result is a lower price to non-WIC customers as compared to a world with a WIC program but without WIC rebates.
Betson notes that implementation of a WIC program should increase wholesale prices as compared to a world without a WIC program, but leaves it unclear whether wholesale prices are higher or lower in a world with a WIC program and a rebate program, as compared to a world with neither. Betson's model also does not model a spillover effect and also implicitly assumes that rebates adjust cent-for-cent with wholesale prices. The model below demonstrates that both of these considerations are important when considering WIC's affect on prices. Huang and Perloff (2007) demonstrate that the spillover effect is likely an important consideration for infant formula manufacturers when setting prices. They use a multinomial-logit model to estimate market shares of different brands of infant formula when they hold and do not hold the WIC contract. They find that after a brand gains the WIC contract, their share of the market increases substantially immediately. However, they find that the brand's share grows even more, gradually over time. Market shares of winning firms grow from less than 20 percent to over 70 percent in less than two years. The authors also find a similar, but opposite, reaction in the brand that loses the WIC contract, and demonstrate that changes in brand shares are not driven by changes in brand prices. However, the paper does not distinguish WIC sales from non-WIC sales and so cannot isolate how much of the increase in share is due to an increase in sales from non-WIC customers. In the model below, I explicitly model the spillover effect as an increase in sales to non-WIC customers.
A Theoretical Model of Rebate Bids and Wholesale Prices
Infant formula manufacturers ( Let represent infant formula demand at an arbitrary non-WIC household j with children of the appropriate age to consume formula. There are two types of non-WIC households; the first type denoted , buys no infant formula. These households choose to solely breastfeed because of the cost of formula feeding or personal preferences. Their marginal rate of substitution is such that maximizing utility at prevailing prices, results in a corner solution, with . The second type of household ( ) purchases a positive amount of infant formula, equal to a j , where a j is normally distributed with mean µ and standard deviation , or ( ). At prevailing prices, these households maximize utility such that they demand a positive amount of infant formula. But once that decision is made the household must purchase the amount of infant formula the infant needs to be healthy.
Let represent the total number of non-breastfeeding, non-WIC infants in market i.
Total demand for formula from non-WIC customers in market i is ( )
Total market demand is dependent on price because each household's decision for whether to consume infant formula is dependent on price. (4) ( ) Oliveira and Davis (2006) demonstrate that firms change wholesale prices infrequently, with durations of about 12 -18 months between increases. Rebate contract auctions do not generally coincide with changes in wholesale prices, suggesting that wholesale prices and rebates are determined at different points in time so one is predetermined at the time the other is determined. While the strategic interactions that led to the -rebate program‖ (and firms' participation in it) are not well understood, I leave that investigation for future research and here 10 Residual demand is firm m's demand, ∑ .
assume that firms make decisions under the current rebate format. I assume some rebates contracts are already in existence for firm m, and it must, at different points in time, make decisions about wholesale prices and rebates. I consider the wholesale price decision first.
Since rebate contracts are already in force ρ m,i is equal to one in these markets and let ρ m equal the proportion of the I markets for which firm m holds the WIC contract. Let is (dropping the m subscript for convenience),
.
Firm m chooses price to maximize expected profit,
can be rearranged to give the optimal price as 12 (7)
Once firms set their wholesale price, they determine optimal rebate bids. Because P is predetermined, the firm's decision to find the optimal rebate is to choose R i to maximize expected profit from market i
11 I have data for only US markets, so -I‖ includes all WIC agencies in the US. 12 Note that firm m is not a monopoly because residual non-WIC demands,q w , q l , are functions of the prices of rival firms. So, for example, ∑ , and firm m considers the reactions of rivals when setting prices.
Let np i = (P-R i ) represent net price in market i. Because P is predetermined, choosing np i is equivalent to choosing R i and the first-order condition is (9) [ ] ( ) where < 0 is the marginal change in the probability of winning an auction, from a change in the net price (rebate) bid. Solving equation 10 gives the optimal net price (rebate) to bid in market i,
( )
The optimal net price equals the marginal cost of supplying market i, adjusted higher by , a measure representing bid shading, and adjusted lower by the additional profits earned from the non-WIC market, per unit of items sold to WIC participants (i.e., ( ) ). These additional profits are earned only if firm m holds the WIC contract.
To see that represents the amount of bid shading, reorder 10 as
. The left-hand side is now the total profit from holding the WIC contract, per unit of items sold to WIC participants. The right-hand side is the probability of winning the contract, normalized by the response in probability from a change in bid. The righthand side is an indicator of the competitiveness of the auction; larger values imply larger profits and are desired by firms (See Crespi and Sexton 2005 for a similar application to cattle procurement.). Higher profits are a consequence of a larger probability of winning, or a smaller response in probability from change in bid. Larger ω i suggests a more competitive auction and smaller profits for firm m.
Equation 10 shows that it may be optimal to bid a net price below marginal cost to gain a WIC contract if the additional profit earned from holding the contract is greater than the amount of bid shading allowed by the competitiveness of the auction, | | ( ) .
Net price below cost may occur, for example, when auctions are very competitive, | | is small, or when a market offers a large profit from non-WIC customers, ( ) is large.
An Empirical Specification to Identify Marginal Costs and Spillover Effects
Equations 7 and 10 represent a system of equations that, in principle, could be simultaneously Let y i denote the choice of agency i that maximizes agency utility from the M firms,
is McFadden's conditional logit model (Maddala, pp 61) .
Data
The primary data in this study are a time-series, cross-section of each firm's winning and losing rebate bids for all contract auctions from 1986 through 2007. The firms in the data are Mead Table 3 reports the results from the net price regression. While the regression is mostly concerned with an accurate prediction of agency costs and not necessarily in the relationship between variables and net price, most coefficients follow intuitive expectations. Births and non-WIC infants usually lead to lower net price bids. Firms with plants distant from an alliance seem to bid higher net prices, likely reflecting higher transportation costs. Sole-source, sealed-bid contracts elicit lower net price bids than other contract types.
Multinomial Logit Estimates
The theory above suggests that choice probabilities should be estimated using the predicted values of a net price regression. Table 4 shows the parameter estimates from a multinomial logit estimation. As expected, the probability of winning is negatively related to net price. Table 5 shows actual winning proportions and predicted winning probabilities, which are very close. ̂ is the marginal effect of net price, and suggests that, for example, a $.10 increase in Mead
Johnson's net-price bid, is associated with a .12 decrease in the probability of winning (other firm's marginal effects are interpreted analogously). 
Spillover Effects and Marginal Costs
With estimates of use a non-fat dry milk price index, a dry whole milk price index, dry whey prices, the dairy producer price index, and firm-dummies as instruments for P m .
The estimates in IV1 are from the most restricted specification and estimates adjusted net prices as a function of the all-firm average marginal cost and an all-firm average . 22 Estimates in this column suggest that the average marginal cost over all firms is $.37 for a 13-ounce can of milk-based liquid concentrate (in 2007 dollars). The average wholesale price is about $3.02, and it appears firms price far above marginal cost. It is important to note that price above marginal cost does not necessarily imply supra-normal profits. Mead Johnson and Ross are both divisions of pharmaceutical companies and market infant formula using a method commonly used to market pharmaceuticals known as medical detailing (Samuels 1993; GAO 1998) . In this practice, infant formula is marketed through endorsements from the medical establishment-physicians and hospitals-rather than through direct advertisement to consumers. Carnation markets infant formula directly to consumers. Medical detailing may involve high fixed costs not reflected in marginal cost estimates here.
The estimate of an all-firm average spillover effect, , is about .35. This is the expected increase in unit sales from non-WIC customers that results from a firm winning the WIC contract. Huang and Perloff (2007) examine the spillover effect in infant formula markets using scanner data. They examine the pattern in brand shares of the firms that win or lose the WIC contract. They show that the brand holding a WIC contract maintains a share above 70%, while other firm's shares are below 20%. If the WIC contract holder changes, then the market shares 22 It is tempting to test the predictions of the theoretical model by testing the hypothesis that . But is identified through variation in both and and therefore
) (anp represents the left-hand-side of 12, i.e., adjusted net price).
Hypothesis tests of require knowledge of the sign and magnitude of ( ) , which are unavailable. And, it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate them as they require examining firms' wholesale-price setting behavior.
reverse. The new winner's share increases over time to about 70% and the losers share falls to about 20%. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that market shares increase about 50% as a consequence of holding the WIC contract. However, Huang and Perloff cannot discern how much of the increase in share comes from non-WIC customers. Remember that rebates are large and the net price earned from WIC customers is consequently low. Even so, it appears net price bids are frequently above marginal cost. However, another attraction of holding the WIC contract is an increase in sales to non-WIC customers, who appear to be very profitable considering that I estimate marginal costs far below wholesale price. 
Implications for Non-WIC Purchasers
A concern for policy makers has been the effect of the WIC program on non-WIC customers.
GAO was asked to address this issue and offered commentary on the likelihood in their 1998
report. Betson (2009) contends that rebates play no role in firms' price setting decisions.
Equation 7 shows this proposition is true only if , which Betson recognizes is a maintained hypothesis in his model. While is undoubtedly correct for specific WIC contracts in the short run because contracts include inflation provisions that require (essentially) cent-for-cent increases in rebates if wholesale prices increase during the duration of the contract.
However, subsequent contracts may result in an agency paying a higher or lower net-price. That is, , which is a key determinant for whether the WIC program with rebates affects firms' pricing decisions.
Firms set prices and rebates according to equations 7 and 10 to maximize profits, rearranging equation 7 provides a convenient way to demonstrate WIC's effect for non-WIC customers, ) where and are the firm's residual demand elasticities evaluated at q w and q l and is the firm m's price elasticity of WIC contracts won. As long as the winning proportion is a linear function of net price, then and ( ), and after substituting 13 becomes,
Equation 14 shows the optimal price-cost markup for infant formula manufacturers. In the absence of the WIC program, i.e., and , then ( ) which is the familiar Lerner Index, adapted to oligopoly, similar to the concept developed in Baker and Bresnahan (1988) ; a firm's price-cost markup is inversely related to its residual demand elasticity.
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Equation 14 shows that the effect of the WIC program on price-cost markups (and price since marginal costs are constant) depends on the magnitude and sign of .
Proposition 1: If , the effect of the WIC program is to increase price-cost markups.
Proof:
The denominator is negative, since and . The numerator is the change in profit from an increase in . An increase in will lead to a price increase if increasing price increases profits from the WIC market (the numerator), while not losing too many non-WIC customers (the denominator).
The numerator is positive if ( ) and (
. Since 23 Baker and Bresnahan (1988) show that a firm's residual demand elasticity can be represented as ∑ where is the firm's own-price elasticity, are cross-price elasticities, and is the firm's conjectured price reactions of rivals. If conjectured price reactions are consistent in the sense that actual reactions equal conjectured reactions, then the inverse of the residual demand elasticity accurately estimates price-cost markups. It seems almost inconceivable that the three firms in the infant formula market would not be able to accurately estimate their rival's price reactions.
, it must be that | ( )| in order that the numerator be positive; table 7 provides evidence that this is the case. Because rebates are not matched cent-for-cent with price increases, increases in price increase profits from each unit sold to the WIC market, minus the change in the rebate. If rebates decrease, or increase by less than the price increase (i.e., net price increases), then profit from the WIC market will increase. The incentive to increase price is offset by the loss of sales to the non-WIC market which is in the denominator. Larger values here counteract the price increasing effect of sales to the WIC market.
Proposition 2: If , the effect of the WIC program is to decrease price-cost markups.
If rebates are negotiated to increase at a rate greater than increases in P (e.g., net prices decrease), then profits decline from the WIC market. WIC customers do not create an incentive to increase P because profits do not increase from the WIC market as rebates are negotiated to increase more than prices. Indeed the WIC program creates an incentive to decrease price-cost margins. (I again assume ( ( )) based on the evidence in table 7.)
Proposition 3: If , the WIC program has no effect on price-cost markups. Proof:
The propositions above suggest that identifying is key to understanding the implications of WIC for non-WIC purchasers. Equation 10 represents the optimal rebate bid, and rearranging it slightly gives,
Totally differentiating 15 suggests that the change in rebate from a price change is ambiguous,
The theoretical model does not provide unambiguous guidance for the sign or magnitude of .
But, the relationship can be estimated with data on rebates and wholesale prices. Figure 2 shows real annual-average wholesale prices from all manufactures, and average annual rebates (using rebates that are newly negotiated in that year). 24 The two series are trending upward suggesting they are related, but also suggesting that they may not be stationary;
regressing one non-stationary variable on another can lead to spurious correlations when none exist (Greene, . Considering the cross-section, time-series nature of the data, with gaps between time periods, it is difficult to identify unit-roots using standard techniques. My estimation strategy is to create a time-series of rebates and wholesale prices from each new contract at each agency, and then to difference each series. The differences are between consecutive rebate contracts at an agency and do not represent consecutive years. I then regress differenced rebates on differenced wholesale prices. Including wholesale price on the right hand side of a rebate regression may induce endogeneity bias and I conduct a Hausman test using a non-fat dry milk price index, a dry whole milk price index, dry whey prices, and the dairy producer price index as instruments. I find no evidence of significant bias and conduct OLS regressions with standard errors corrected for clustering within agencies. 
Conclusions
The WIC program has developed a creative way to limit the cost of procuring infant formula for participating infants by offering manufacturing firms the exclusive right to sell to WIC customers in exchange for a per unit rebate. While saving the government over $1.5 billion annually, WIC rebates have generated considerable debate concerning their implications for non-WIC purchasers. WIC infant formula rebates were born as a reaction to rising infant formula prices to WIC agencies, yet debate has centered around rebates as a cause of increasing wholesale prices. The evidence presented here suggests that high and increasing infant formula prices result from market conditions independent from WIC's rebate system. Indeed it appears the WIC rebates enhance competition for WIC customers. Firms are enticed to bid aggressively for the exclusive WIC contract in part because of the 30-40 percent increase in sales to the highly profitable non-WIC customers.
I develop a method to estimate the marginal cost of infant formula and find that it is very low when compared to wholesale prices. WIC's effect turns on the relationship between rebates and wholesale prices. The model suggests that if rebates respond to price changes at a rate greater than one, then the WIC program will depress price-cost margins. If on the other hand, rebates respond to price changes at a rate less than 1, then the WIC program will increase price cost margins. The empirical evidence suggests that rebates and wholesale prices adjust at a rate equal to 1. However, that relationship appears to be weaker for contracts negotiated in more recent years.
It is interesting to note the implications of the spillover effect. First, the spillover effect leads to larger rebates. In equation 10, net price decreases with increases in θ. The auction used a sole-source, sealed-bid format (yes=1, no=0) Previous Bidding firm held the agency's previous contract (yes=1, no=0) Contract Length
The specified length of the contract at the date of the RFP (in days) Number of Bidders
The number of firms submitting bids in an auction.
Composite
The agency required a single composite rebate bids for soy and milk products (yes=1, no=0) Uncoupled
The agency required separate bids for soy and milk-based products, and separate contracts were offered for soy or milk-based products (yes=1, no=0) Hausman p-value 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.935 Standard errors in () adjusted for correlation and heteroskedasticity (clustering) within alliance. *=.10 significance **=.05 significance, ***.01 significance a: Hausman test for endogeneity of (q N /q W ) and P m 1988-2007 1988-2007 1988-2007 1992-2007 1996-2007 1999-2007 2004- Standard errors in () adjusted for correlation and heteroskedasticity (clustering) within alliance. *=.10 significance **=.05 significance, ***.01 significance 
